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INTRODUCTION
Recognizing the ease with which oral communication can be
recorded and distributed in an increasingly technological society, the
Illinois General Assembly enacted the Illinois Eavesdropping Law
(IEL) to protect an individual’s right not to be recorded without her
permission.1 The IEL, most recently amended in 1994, prohibits
recording oral communication between conversing parties without
both parties’ consent.2 Notably, the IEL criminalizes recording without
consent, regardless of whether the conversing parties intended the
communication to be private.3
Tension between eavesdropping statutes and the First
Amendment brought similar statutes under review in numerous

1

See Illinois Eavesdropping Law, 720 ILCS § 5/14-1(d) (1994).
Id.
3
Id.
2
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circuits throughout the country.4 In 2012, the Seventh Circuit
addressed this issue in American Civil Liberties Union v. Alvarez.5 In
Alvarez, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) sought
declaratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of the IEL over its
police accountability program, in which ACLU members would
publish audiovisual recordings of police officers performing their
duties.6 Overturning the district court’s dismissal of the ACLU’s
amended complaint, Judge Sykes, writing for the majority, granted the
ACLU injunctive relief and analyzed in detail the constitutionality of
the IEL under the First Amendment.7 In doing so, the majority held
that the ACLU would likely succeed on the merits of its claim that the
IEL violates rights protected by the First Amendment.8 Judge Posner
dissented, arguing that the IEL survives the intermediate scrutiny test
under the First Amendment because it protects the legitimate
government interest of privacy.9
This Comment proposes that while the Seventh Circuit
correctly found that the IEL is likely unconstitutional under the First
Amendment, the court incorrectly characterized the right to record as
the expansive right of expression guaranteed by the plain text of the
First Amendment. Instead, the Seventh Circuit should have found that
the right to record falls within the more narrow right to gather
information under the First Amendment, which the Supreme Court of
the United States first dictated in Branzburg v. Hayes.10 Part I of this
Comment provides an overview of the IEL and the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Alvarez. Part II of this Comment analyzes how the
Supreme Court of the United States and other federal circuits have
characterized the right to record as a right to gather information under
the First Amendment. Finally, Part III of this Comment argues that the
4

Glik v. Cuniffee, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000).
Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586 (7th
Cir.2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012).
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 610 (Posner, J., dissenting).
10
Id. at 586 (majority opinion); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679-680
(1972).
5
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Seventh Circuit should adopt this narrower interpretation of the First
Amendment and characterize the right to record as the limited right to
gather information under the First Amendment.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. The evolution of the Illinois Eavesdropping Law
In 1961, the Illinois General Assembly enacted the original IEL,
which prohibited the use of “an eavesdropping device to hear or record
all or part of any oral conversation without the consent of any party
thereto.”11 An eavesdropping device is defined as any device that may
be used to hear or record an oral conversation for the purpose of
eavesdropping.12 The committee comment notes of the 1961 statute
indicate a clear intent to protect the privacy of conversation between
individuals.13 However, the statute was amended in 1976, emphasizing
the legislature’s concern for consent over privacy.14
The 1976 amendment required the consent of all parties to the
conversation before the conversation could be recorded legally.15
However, in 1986, the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Beardsley
narrowly interpreted the 1976 amendment to prohibit recording only
those conversations that were intended to be private, regardless of
consent.16 In Beardsley, the defendant was convicted under the IEL for
recording two police officers from the back of their squad car.17 The
Illinois Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction under the
IEL, despite the fact that the defendant did not have permission to
record either police officer, as required by the 1976 amendment.18
Instead, the court interpreted the IEL statute to apply only to those
11

Illinois Eavesdropping Law, 720 ILCS § 5/14-1(a) (1994).
Id.
13
Celia G. Gamrath, A Lawyer's Guide to Eavesdropping in Illinois, 87 Ill. B.J.
362, 363 (1999).
14
§ 5/14-2(a)(1).
15
Id.; Gamrath, supra note 13, at 363-64.
16
People v. Beardsley, 115 Ill.2d 47, 49 (1986).
17
Id. at 50.
18
Id.
12
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situations where the conversing parties had an expectation of
privacy.19 Because the police officers conversed in front of the
defendant, the court held they had no expectation of privacy from his
recording.20 Accordingly, the court reversed the defendant’s
conviction, finding that there was no violation of the IEL.21
Eight years later, the Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed its
interpretation that recording a conversation was only punishable under
the IEL if the conversing parties had an expectation of privacy.22 In
People v. Herrington, a defendant was found not to have violated the
IEL where she secretly recorded a conversation she had with a suspect
without his consent.23 Like in Beardsley, the court in Herrington found
that the suspect had no expectation of privacy from the person he was
conversing with, whether or not that person previously obtained his
consent.24
In response to the Illinois Supreme Court’s reluctance to give
weight to the consent requirement of the 1976 amendment, the Illinois
legislature amended the IEL once again in 1994.25 This time the
legislature unequivocally contradicted the Illinois Supreme Court’s
precedent by prohibiting the recording of conversations “regardless of
whether one or more of the parties intended their communication to be
of a private nature,” thus overriding the Beardsley and Herrington
decisions.26 In doing so, the Illinois legislature gave teeth to the 1976
consent amendment, and explicitly eliminated a privacy requirement
under the IEL.27

19

Id. at 56.
Id. at 64.
21
Id. at 65.
22
People v. Herrington, 163 Ill.2d 507, 510 (1994).
23
Id. at 511-12.
24
Beardsley, 115 Ill.2d at 50; Herrington, 163 Ill.2d at 510.
25
Illinois Eavesdropping Law, 720 ILCS § 5/14-1(d) (1994); Beardsley, 115
Ill.2d at 65; Herrington, 163 Ill.2d at 511.
26
§ 5/14-1(d); Beardsley, 115 Ill.2d at 65; Herrington, 163 Ill.2d at 511.
27
720 ILCS §§ 5/14-1(d)-2(a)(1); Gamrath, supra note 13, at 363-64.
20
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B. American Civil Liberties Union v. Anita Alvarez
In 2012, the American Civil Liberties Union challenged the
constitutionality of the Illinois legislature’s amendment to the IEL
through a preliminary injunction. In Alvarez, the Seventh Circuit, in
evaluating the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits,
conducted a detailed analysis of the constitutionality of the IEL, noting
that in First Amendment cases, “the likelihood of success on the merits
will often be the determinative factor.”28 The court also noted that
appellate review of an injunction is appropriate where the case “raises
only a legal question,” like in Alvarez.29
The district court found the ACLU lacked standing for two
reasons, but the first was cured before appeal.30 The second reason
was the basis for the district court’s dismissal of the ACLU’s
complaint.31 The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint
because it found that the First Amendment does not protect a right to
audio record, and thus the ACLU could not allege a constitutional
injury.32 However, on appeal, the majority held that the right to audio
record is expression protected by the First Amendment, so the court
allowed the case to proceed.33

28

Joelner v. Village of Washington Park, Ill., 378 F.3d 613, 620 (7th Cir.

2004).
29

Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 590 (7th Cir.
2012)(citing Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland, 664 F.3d 139, 151 (7th Cir.
2006)) (holding that plaintiff’s injunction was properly decided on appeal because it
raised a pure legal question under the First Amendment).
30
After the ACLU amended its complaint, the District Court found the ACLU
had standing based on a credible threat of prosecution. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 591.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 590.
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1. The Majority’s Analysis
The majority began its analysis by discounting the district
court’s reading of Potts v. City of Lafayette.34 The district court had
based its dismissal of the ACLU’s complaint on the Seventh Circuit’s
language in Potts, which stated “there is nothing in the Constitution
which guarantees the right to record a public event.”35 However, the
Seventh Circuit found the district court’s reading of Potts to be too
narrow, and pointed to other language within the opinion which stated
that the right to record, or the right to gather information, may be
limited under proper time, place or manner restrictions applicable to
content-neutral regulations.36 The court cited this language as
evidence that, even in Potts, the court considered the right to record to
be protected, at least in part, by the First Amendment.37
The district court also dismissed the ACLU’s complaint
because it found there could be no reciprocal right to receive speech
without a willing speaker.38 However, the Seventh Circuit reasoned
that Alvarez does not implicate the “willing speaker doctrine” because
the speech has already taken place, been heard, or been “received.”39
The court noted that anyone standing within earshot of an officer can
hear what he says, so the speech has been received, and it requires no
“presupposed willing speaker.”40 Therefore, the remaining question is
only whether the government can restrict the way in which speech is
received.41 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit centered its analysis in
Alvarez on this issue.42 The court analyzed the right to audio record as
34

Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 591 (citing Potts v. City of Lafayette, 121 F.3d 1106,
1111 (7th Cir. 1997)).
35
Id.
36
Potts, 121 F.3d at 1111 (holding that an officer may refuse entry to an
onlooker at a Ku Klux Klan rally for bringing a video camera onsite because the
camera could be used as a weapon or projectile in a volatile situation).
37
Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 590-91.
38
Id. at 592.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 595.
42
Id. at 595.
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two protected First Amendment rights: a) the right of free expression;
and b) the right to gather information.43 First, the court argued that
audio recording is an integral step in the speech process, such as note
taking, and should be equated with free expression.44 Next, the court
explored the narrower right to gather information under the First
Amendment.45
a. The Seventh Circuit’s characterization of the right to
record as free expression.
The majority stated that audiovisual recordings are media of
expression commonly used for the preservation and dissemination of
information and ideas and thus are “included within the free speech”
guarantee of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.46 The court
reasoned that by prohibiting audiovisual recording, the IEL
“forecloses an entire medium of expression,” preventing individuals
from disseminating audio recordings, and in turn, limiting free
expression.47
The court cited various examples to illustrate this notion,
including an individual’s ability to take notes, write, or paint a public
event without the consent of those participating.48 The majority found
these actions to be part of a process of expression, which if regulated,
would ultimately regulate free expression.49 The Seventh Circuit
referred to the Supreme Court’s campaign-finance cases to further
illustrate this point.50 In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court held that
restricting how money can be spent on political communication
necessarily reduces the quantity and quality of expression.51 Similarly,
the Seventh Circuit argued that restricting the medium of audiovisual
43

Id. at 598.
Id. at 595-98.
45
Id. at 598.
46
Id. at 595.
47
Id. at 596.
48
Id. at 595-96.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 596-97.
51
Id. at 596 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 4 (1976)).
44
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recording would also limit the breadth and depth of topics, which
would otherwise be discussed after the distribution of these
recordings.52 More specifically, the court reasoned that the ACLU’s
intent to record police officers would spark discussion, criticism, and
speech about government conduct, speech that lies at the core of the
First Amendment.53 The court held that because the IEL restricts a
medium of expression, it restricts an integral step in the speech
process.54
b. The Seventh Circuit’s characterization of the right to
record as the narrower right to gather information.
The majority then transitioned from its argument that
audiovisual recording is a step in the overall process of expression to
exploring the narrower right to gather information under the First
Amendment.55 The court cited the Supreme Court opinion Branzburg
v. Hayes, where a journalist was compelled to reveal his confidential
source to a grand jury despite the burden this revelation had on his
newsgathering function.56 Despite the outcome of Branzburg, the
Supreme Court acknowledged within the opinion that newsgathering
qualifies for First Amendment protection, noting, “Without some
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated.”57 However, the Court in the same opinion cautioned
against an expansive right to gather information.58 Ultimately, the
Seventh Circuit relied on Branzburg to establish that some, at least
limited, right to gather information exists under the First
Amendment.59

52

Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 596-97.
Id. at 597.
54
Id. at 599.
55
Id. at 597.
56
Id. at 598; Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972).
57
Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 598; Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681.
58
Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 598-99.
59
Id. at 597-98.
53
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c. The Seventh Circuit applies its analysis to find that the
statute is likely unconstitutional under the First
Amendment.
The court then analyzed which standard of scrutiny should be
applied to the IEL.60 Because content-specific regulations are
presumptively invalid, they are subject to strict scrutiny.61 Contrarily,
content-neutral regulations are subject to intermediate scrutiny,
requiring that a statute’s means reasonably achieve a significant
governmental interest. 62 Thus, a content-neutral regulatory measure
may be permissible as a reasonable “time, place, or manner
restriction.”63
In Alvarez, the court found it “unlikely that strict scrutiny will
apply” because the IEL restricts all audio recordings regardless of
what is recorded and thus is content-neutral on its face.64 In holding
so, the court rejected the ACLU’s argument that because a court would
have to hear the recording to determine if it violated the IEL, it must
be content specific.65 On the contrary, the court acknowledged that it
is often necessary for a judicial body to hear or see speech to
determine if it violates a law, but that need alone does not make the
law a content-specific regulation.66 Accordingly, the court applied the
intermediate standard of scrutiny and found that the statute is likely
unconstitutional under even this lower standard.67
Although the court acknowledged that the government has a
significant interest in privacy, it held that the 1994 amendment to the
IEL does not reasonably achieve this interest.68 Because the 1994
amendment criminalizes recording conversation without the consent of
all the parties, regardless of the fact that the speech was said publicly,
60

Id. at 603.
Id.
62
Id. at 604-605.
63
Id. at 605.
64
Id. at 604.
65
Id. at 603-604.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 607.
68
Id. at 605.
61

424
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out-loud, and without any secrecy, the court reasoned that it is overly
broad, and thus overly restricting of a protected First Amendment
right.69 Under the 1994 amendment, if a person did not obtain the
consent of a public speaker, she could be prosecuted under the IEL for
recording conversation that was intended to be public. As such, the
court went to great lengths to distinguish a statute that criminalizes the
recording of private conversation from a statute that criminalizes the
recording of any conversation.70 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit
found that the IEL is likely unconstitutional under the First
Amendment, and granted the ACLU’s preliminary injunction.71
2. Judge Posner’s Dissent
Judge Posner, in his dissent, cited three main reasons for
dissenting from the majority’s analysis: 1) people retain an expectation
of privacy even in public forums; 2) there is a significant government
interest in ensuring the safety of officers, informants, and witnesses;
and 3) the majority’s interpretation will have a chilling effect on
speech.72 For these reasons, Judge Posner would have affirmed the
decision of the District Court and held for the defendant in this case.73
First, Judge Posner went to great lengths to establish that
people retain some expectation of privacy even in public settings. He
cited various examples to illustrate this point, including a situation
where a police officer may be speaking with a victim in a low voice on
a crowded sidewalk.74 He argued that even though there are people
within earshot, as the IEL requires, the conversing parties might still
have a reasonable expectation of privacy.75 Civilians speaking to
police officers might also retain an expectation of privacy when they
69

Id. at 607.
Id. at 605-06.
71
Id. at 608.
72
Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 610 (7th Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012) (Posner, J., dissenting).
73
Id. at 610.
74
Id.
75
Id.
70
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are conversing with an officer. This holds particularly true when the
civilian is a victim, witness, or informant trying to communicate
urgently, but privately, with the police.76 Judge Posner asserted that
public spaces still include speakers with reasonable privacy
expectations.77 Moreover, he argued that the IEL seeks to protect
exactly this privacy by requiring consent of the conversing parties.78
Thus, he suggested that there is a governmental interest in protecting
private conversation that occurs in public places. As such, under his
analysis, a consent requirement is a regulation within the means of the
legislature to proscribe.79
Second, Judge Posner cautioned the majority on the dangerous
effect the Alvarez decision may have on future police activity.80 He
painted a picture where both civilians and officers are put at risk when
private information is released to the public.81 He also stated that
distracting officers from their duties by requiring them to anticipate a
recording in a society where almost every individual regularly carries
a recording device in their phone is detrimental to the safety of the
officer and the people he seeks to protect.82
Third, and finally, Judge Posner used both of these compelling
governmental interests to illustrate that the majority’s attempt to
protect First Amendment rights will have the exact opposite effect,
and will instead chill free expression.83 Judge Posner discussed the
significant impact that a recording has on the credibility of an
individual, much more of an impact than note taking or recitation.84
He emphasized that this is particularly true in a society where things
are uploaded to the Internet and distributed within seconds.85 Judge
Posner argued that allowing individuals to take audio recordings of
76

Id. at 611-612.
Id. at 613-614.
78
Id. at 610.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 611.
82
Id. at 612-13.
83
Id. at 609.
84
Id. at 614.
85
Id. at 612.
77

426

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013

11

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 7

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 8, Issue 2

Spring 2013

people without their consent will make people overly cautious about
what they can say, thus deterring free expression .86 Consequently,
Judge Posner dissented from the majority, and found that the ACLU
would not likely succeed on the merits.
II. SUPREME COURT AND FEDERAL CIRCUITS INTERPRET THE RIGHT
TO RECORD AS THE RIGHT TO GATHER INFORMATION
Though the Supreme Court has never ruled on the right to take
an audiovisual recording of a police officer, it has more broadly
acknowledged a First Amendment right to gather information.87
Various circuits, in interpreting the right to audio record officers, have
ruled in conjunction with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Branzburg,
and found that the right to record stems from a limited First
Amendment right to gather information.88
A. Supreme Court
As discussed in Section B of this Comment, the Supreme Court
of the United States first recognized the right to gather information in
Branzburg v. Hayes. In that case, the Court reasoned that in order for
the press, or people, to have the right to speak, they must first have
some smaller right to seek out information. Consequently, the
Supreme Court interpreted the First Amendment to protect at least
some right to gather information.89
However, the Court has also cautioned against finding that the
right to speak and publish carries with it the unrestrained right to
gather information.90 Instead, the Court acknowledged that the right to
gather information, if interpreted too broadly, would have detrimental
effects on government functions, such as judicial, administrative, and
86

Id. at 613-14.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709 (1972).
88
Glik v. Cuniffee, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000).
89
Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 at 708.
90
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965); Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of
Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 15 (1986).
87
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even military operations.91 The right to gather information, when
characterized as a narrow First Amendment right, can be weighed
properly against other governmental interests, such as privacy.
However, as the Seventh Circuit noted in Alvarez, the Supreme Court
has not clarified the scope of the right to gather information since
Branzburg.92
B. Other Circuits
Since Branzburg, other federal circuits have relied upon the
Supreme Court’s delineation of the First Amendment right to gather
information when evaluating the validity of eavesdropping statutes.
The First Circuit in Glik v. Cuniffee held that police officers
were not entitled to qualified immunity for arresting the plaintiff for
recording the officers performing their public duties.93 Under a
qualified immunity analysis, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an
officer violated a clearly established constitutional right. In Glik, the
court held that the officers violated the plaintiff’s clearly established
right to record matters of public concern. Notably, the court reasoned
that the right to record matters of public concern derives from the
limited right to gather information under the First Amendment, rather
than the expansive right of free expression.94
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in Smith v. City of Cumming
held that the right to photograph and videotape police conduct is
protected by the First Amendment right to gather information about
what public officials do on public property.95 The court further held
that the right to gather information is a limited First Amendment right
that is subject to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions.96
Though the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has not heard this
issue, its district courts have also reasoned in Robinson v. Fetterman
91

Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 at 706.
Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 599-600.
93
Glik, 212 F.3d at 1333.
94
Id.
95
Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000).
96
Id. at 1332-1333.
92
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and Pomykacz v. Borough of West Wildwood that the right to film
police officers in the performance of their public duties is derived
from the right to gather information under the First Amendment.97
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized a
limited First Amendment right to gather information.98 When
presented with eavesdropping statutes, several circuits, including the
First, Third, and Eleventh Circuits, have all interpreted the right to
audio record as a right to gather information under the First
Amendment, subject to reasonable time, place and manner
restrictions.99 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit should also find that the
right is derived from a limited right to gather information under the
First Amendment, rather than equating audiovisual recording to free
expression.
III. SEVENTH CIRCUIT SHOULD INTERPRET THE RIGHT TO AUDIO
RECORD AS A LIMITED FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
GATHER INFORMATION
A. The Seventh Circuit’s Flawed Legal Reasoning
The Supreme Court of the United States has not yet decided
whether the right to audio record officers is free speech.100 Instead, the
Court has set out a limited right to gather information under the First
Amendment.101 The circuits have interpreted the right to audio record
government officials as a right to gather information under the First
Amendment. The Seventh Circuit should follow the precedent outlined
by the Supreme Court and other federal circuits and find that the First
Amendment right raised by the IEL is the right to gather information,
rather than free expression itself.

97

Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F.Supp.2d 534, 541 (E.D.Pa. 2005); Pomykacz
v. Borough of West Wildwood, 438 F.Supp.2d 504, 513 (D.N.J. 2006).
98
Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 at 706.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
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As the First Circuit noted in Glik, the right to audio record
police officers is central to an individual’s ability to collect
information about the government and its activities.102 As the majority
noted in Alvarez, the reason the IEL violates the First Amendment is
because it prevents individuals from exercising their ability to collect
and disseminate information about the police.103 Moreover the ACLU,
in its challenge to the constitutionality of the statute, centered its
arguments on the notion that citizens have a right to ensure that police
officers are held accountable for their actions in performing their
public duties.104 However, as the Supreme Court indicated in
Branzburg, though collecting information about the government is
central to the protections of the First Amendment, it is not equal to the
right of free expression. Here, the IEL prohibits the act of recording,
not the act of speaking. In fact, the IEL puts no restriction on an
individual repeating a conversation she hears, or publishing the
contents of that information.105 Thus, the Seventh Circuit incorrectly
equates the right to record someone else’s speech as the right to
express one’s own speech.106
This analysis returns us to the district court’s reasoning that
free expression cannot exist without a willing speaker.107 While the
Seventh Circuit was correct in its assertion that the “unwilling speaker
doctrine” is not implicated where the speech has already been
received, the court incorrectly dismissed the district court’s argument
without acknowledging that there is something inherently different
about reusing the speech of a person who does not wish her voice to be
shared.108 This forced dissemination of expression implicates rights
that are much more similar to the right of an individual to forcibly
gather information about governmental activities. Contrary to the
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majority’s assertion, limiting the extent to which an individual may
record speech does not raise the same vexing concerns that prohibiting
a person from freely expressing their own thoughts would have.109
Specifically, the majority analogized the right to record to
many actions that qualify as free expression under the First
Amendment.110 For example, an individual enjoys the right to take
notes during governmental committee meetings.111 However, this
analogy fails to account for the fact that taking notes still requires
independent thought, and disseminating the information requires
independent expression. In contrast, recording a police officer’s voice
and distributing it simply regurgitates speech. Moreover, even if a
person were to take notes verbatim, this transcript is still less
egregious than the voice recording of a person because the recording
damages credibility in a way that notes could not. With an audio
recording a person cannot simply deny the allegations made against
her, and her credibility is impeached in an irreversible way. The
ACLU seeks to use audio recordings because they have a unique
ability to, as Judge Posner indicated in his dissent, damage the
credibility of an individual. Thus, this uniqueness must be
acknowledged when evaluating its nature under the First Amendment.
The majority also analogized the right to record to the right to
donate campaign funds.112 However, the fatal flaw in this analogy is
that donating campaign funds still involves willing free expression.
Campaign donations provide individuals with the ability to use money
as an instrument of expression to promote their own ideas. In contrast,
an audio recording promotes ideas that often times the speaker does
not want promoted. The act of recording a conversation at its most
basic level involves gathering information, without any expression.
Even if we adopt the majority’s view that recording speech is only an
integral step in the process of sharing that recording, recording speech
109
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is still the forced dissemination of expression rather than the free
dissemination of it.113 While this audio recording may still enjoy First
Amendment protection, it does so under the First Amendment right to
gather information from an unwilling source.
All of the examples cited by the majority, the right to take
notes, the right to paint, the right to donate campaign funds,
necessarily involve free and willing expression.114 Contrarily,
disseminating an audio recording against the speaker’s wishes
involves the forced dissemination of speech. In equating audio
recording to free expression the majority failed to give this meaningful
distinction its due weight. As such, the majority’s delineation may
negatively impact future First Amendment analysis.
B. Detrimental Policy Implications
The majority’s mischaracterization of the right implicated by
the IEL will likely impact future First Amendment analysis. By
equating audio recording with the vast First Amendment right of free
expression, the majority has given audio recording an unbridled scope
of protection. While it is important to acknowledge that people have a
right to acquire information about their government, and to hold police
officers accountable for their actions, this right is limited, and must be
weighed against other governmental interests.
As Judge Posner indicated in his dissent, it is important to
weigh the state’s interest in protecting the safety of its officers and
citizens with the need to protect the privacy of its inhabitants.115 This
Comment does not assert the state’s interests were reasonably
achieved by the IEL statute, but it does suggest that there are other
governmental interests which should be weighed with a limited First
Amendment right to gather information, rather than the expansive First
Amendment right to speak freely.
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In the Branzburg opinion, the Court acknowledged the very
concerns that are implicated by the IEL.116 In Branzburg, the Court
held that recognizing an overly broad right to gather information might
negatively impact governmental functions.117 That is exactly the
concern raised by the State in this case. As Judge Posner indicated,
permitting audio recording, even in public places, may still chill
speech because it makes a person weary to express their thoughts for
fear of the distribution of her ideas.118 It also distracts police officers
from their duties, and places both their lives and the lives of Illinois’
citizens at risk.119 Because the nature of the right in question in
Alvarez raises many of the same concerns that the Supreme Court
considered in Branzburg, it is more suitable to evaluate audio
recording under Branzburg’s categorization of First Amendment
rights. By acknowledging that the right to audio record is a limited
First Amendment right, the Seventh Circuit would be able to more
accurately balance the state’s compelling interest in protecting the
privacy of its citizens with the safety of its law enforcement.
CONCLUSION
Though the Seventh Circuit correctly found that the IEL was
likely unconstitutional under the First Amendment, the court
mischaracterized the right implicated by audio recording. The Seventh
Circuit should rule consistently with the First, Third, and Eleventh
Circuits and find that the right to audio record is a limited First
Amendment right to gather information, as stated by the Supreme
Court in Branzburg. By acknowledging the limits of this right, the
Seventh Circuit will be able to more accurately weigh the various
governmental interests asserted by the State against the rights
implicated by the IEL.
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